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Fear and loathing on the landscape:
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Abstract: We discuss fear and vigilance from the perspective of foraging theory. Rather than
focusing on proximate indicators of fear, we suggest that fear is an adaptation for assigning a
cost to activities that incur a risk of injury or death. We use theory to provide definitions for fear
and vigilance and then use that theory to compare them. We agree that there are limits to the
reliability of vigilance as an indicator of fear, but we arrive at this conclusion differently.
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In his target article, Guy Beauchamp (2017) concludes that “vigilance may not always be a
reliable indicator of the state of fear.” We concur, but we arrive at this by a somewhat different
route. The target article focuses on proximal indicators of fear such as stress hormones, heart
rate, and other physiological and neurological responses. We suggest that fear is an adaptation
for assigning a cost to activities that incur a risk of injury or death. Vigilance, stress hormones,
physiological state, giving-up densities (the amount of food left behind in a resource patch
following patch exploitation), and time allocation then become tools by which animals manage
and respond to risk. An organism’s use of these tools may covary positively, negatively, or not at
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all. It may even be optimal under some circumstances for an animal to exhibit more vigilance
under safer rather than riskier conditions.
Beauchamp (2017) largely skips the question of theory and the optimal level of vigilance
for foraging animals (starting with Pulliam, 1973), but he does consider them in Beauchamp
(2015). Theory tells us how risk of predation can affect foraging decisions, including patch use
and vigilance (e.g., Lima, 1996; Brown, 1988, 1999). When harvesting resources from depletable
patches, an optimal forager should feed in a patch as long as its harvest rate in the patch
exceeds the sum of its various foraging costs (Brown, 1988, 1992). It should harvest the patch as
long as it profits from doing so. The gains of patch exploitation come from harvesting food. The
costs arise from energetic costs of foraging, from the missed opportunity of not engaging in
other valuable activities, and from exposure to risk of predation.
The risk of predation gives rise to a foraging cost, and animals respond to it by foraging
less, avoiding risky habitats and microhabitats, directing their efforts to safer places, and
altering their vigilance (e.g., Lima & Dill, 1990; Brown & Kotler, 2004). By doing so, foragers
accept lower harvest rates and harvest less food. In return they lower their chances of being
captured by a predator. This tradeoff of food and safety has consequences for population
growth rates, species interactions, and community structure. The predation cost of foraging, P,
can take the form (Brown, 1992):
𝑃=

𝜇∙𝐹

Eq. 1

𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝑒

where P is the predation cost of foraging, µ is the risk of predation, F is survivor’s fitness (the
fitness that a forager expects should it live to its next reproduction), and ∂F/∂e is the marginal
value of energy (or resources) (Houston & McNamara, 1999; Clark, 1994; Brown, 1992).
The “job” of fear is to assign a predation cost to an activity. The ecological manifestation
of fear includes how much time an organism allocates to different times and places, and how
much vigilance to employ while there. From this perspective, fear should be determined by the
risk of predation, the energetic state of the organism, its prospects for the future, and the value
of the current activity. Here we apply an ultimate causation definition for fear as an adaptation.
It ignores the question of how a given species assesses and processes the key bits that go into P.
Our definition makes it easy to define the landscape of fear (Laundre at al. 2010). It is
simply the predation costs of foraging mapped out in time and space across the physical
landscape (van der Merwe & Brown 2008). It can be mapped by measuring the quitting harvest
rate of foragers and how it changes across the landscape. Such landscapes have been mapped
for a variety of organisms including Cape ground squirrels (van der Merwe & Brown 2008), ibex
(Iribarren & Kotler 2012a), klipspringers (Druce et al. 2006), gerbils (Bleicher et al. in review),
and free-ranging goats (Shrader et al. 2008). Such maps reveal the features of the landscape
that are most beneficial to organisms and those that are most detrimental. The landscape of
fear has great utility in conservation and management.
Our definition avoids the pitfalls of what organisms are feeling emotionally, what brain
processes are ongoing, whether their nervous systems are complex enough to feel fear, whether
their physiological responses are consistent with their behavior, etc. We focus on fear as the
product of natural selection. We feel that our definition has greater ecological relevance. It also
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opens up a much wider spectrum of organisms that we can consider to be fearful, from singlecell organisms to multi-cellular organisms that lack central nervous systems and even to plants.
All that is necessary is that they can assess and respond behaviorally (including how they invest
carbon) to risk and the other components required to estimate P.
Theory also informs us about the optimal use of vigilance (e.g., Lima, 1987; Brown,
1999). For cases when vigilance can reduce mortality risk, optimal vigilance for forager i can be
given by (extensions of this relationship exist for group foraging, Ale & Brown, 2007; McNamara
& Houston, 1992):
𝑚𝐹

𝑘

𝑢𝑖 ∗ = √ 𝑖 𝜕𝐹 − 𝑏𝑖
𝑓𝑏( )
𝑖

Eq. 2

𝑖 𝑖 𝜕𝑒

where ui* is the optimal vigilance level (ui* = 0, if (2) returns a negative value), mi is encounter
rate with predators, 1/ki is the lethality of the predator, bi is the effectiveness of vigilance in
reducing mortality, and fi is resource harvest rate for a non-vigilant forager. Vigilance rates
should increase with higher encounter rates with predators, better future prospects, higher
current energetic state (low marginal value of energy – hungry foragers should be less vigilant
than well-fed ones), and greater lethality of the predator. Interestingly, the relationship with
effectiveness of vigilance is inverted U-shaped. It reaches its highest values at intermediate
levels of effectiveness. When vigilance is highly effective, a forager needs little; when it is
ineffective, a forager wants to use little (Brown, 1999). Manipulations of sightlines in gerbils and
in Nubian ibex confirm these predictions (Embar et al., 2011; Iribarren & Kotler, 2012b).
Equations 1 and 2 quantify the relationship between fear and vigilance. They share three
terms appearing in the same place in both equations: survivor’s fitness, marginal value of
energy, and predator encounter rate (predator encounter rate is a component of µ). F and
∂F/∂e are properties of the particular individual. They do not change as the forager moves from
microhabitat to microhabitat and from habitat to habitat across the landscape. Foragers “carry”
these values with them. The state and the marginal value of energy may vary with population,
from week to week, perhaps from day to day, and from individual to individual. Vigilance will
reflect these differences in fear.
Notice how these differences in vigilance do not yet indicate differences in encounter
rates with predators. The encounter rate with predators can change from hour to hour and from
habitat to habitat across the landscape. These changes too will manifest in changes in an
individual’s vigilance level as it moves through its landscape. So, do vigilance levels provide a
good surrogate for P and/or predation risk in general? Yes and No. When the driver of vigilance
is encounter rate with predators, and predator lethality in the absence of vigilance, then: Yes.
But when the driver is changes in the value of vigilance: then No. If vigilance is of little value to a
forager in one habitat compared to another, there will be little vigilance by the forager in that
habitat, whereas the other habitat will see higher vigilance levels; the latter is made safer by
vigilance, but the former remains risky despite vigilance. It is precisely the value of vigilance that
makes one riskier and the other safer. In this case, vigilance will covary negatively with mortality
risk and perhaps with things like stress hormones, heart rate, and other physiological responses
to risk. Can this happen? We have unpublished data suggesting that this is the case for grey
squirrels and fox squirrels at sites around Chicago. The squirrels are less vigilant when foraging
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away from the trees (risky habitat) than near trees (safe habitat). Why? The closer a squirrel is
to a tree, the more readily it can escape an encounter with a predator such as a hawk or coyote.
Hence, the value of vigilance is greater near than far from a tree.
Another key aspect is that vigilance is just one tool – perhaps complementary, perhaps
antagonistic, or perhaps substitutable – among other responses. Time allocation is another tool
for managing predation risk. Foragers use both to determine their optimal patch use and givingup densities while exploiting depletable resource patches (Brown, 1999). Foragers can use a
multitude of combinations of time allocation and vigilance strategies to arrive at a given givingup density. Under conditions where vigilance is ineffective, foragers may manage risk mostly
with time allocation. Empirically, this is seen when they are distracted by the burden of fleas
(Raveh, et al., 2011) or by vegetation that blocks sight lines (Embar, et al., 2011). In these cases,
a mapping of the landscape of fear would look very different from a mapping of vigilance. The
decoupling of fear and vigilance limit the ability to infer one from the other. In this manner,
there are limits to vigilance reflecting fear. For a variety of applications, we see giving-up
densities as a more useful tool for gaining insights into P and actual predation risk.
The above perspectives emerge because we are ecologists, and keenly interested in the
distribution and abundances of organisms. We focus on how behavior influences population
dynamics and species interactions such as competition and predation. We are most interested
in mechanisms of species coexistence, so we focus on foraging behaviors that mediate
interactions between foragers and their resources (or prey) and with their predators. Predators
can affect their prey numerically by killing them (direct effect), and they can affect them by
scaring them and causing them to change behavior (i.e., indirect effect). Systems where the
former predominate are N-driven, and those where the later predominate are µ-driven (often
used by ecologists to represent the mortality risk of predation) (Brown & Kotler, 2007). Effects
arising from the risk of predation are sometimes called trait-mediated indirect effects; they
were formerly referred to as higher-order species interactions and non-linear effects. Our focus
on the predation costs of foraging allows us to best connect the foraging behavior of organisms
to these processes and mechanisms. We fully appreciate approaches to vigilance that explore
the neurological, hormonal, and physiological connections as cognitive animals attempt to
assign P and respond accordingly. Yet, as foragers assess and respond to risk, there will often be
limits to how one particular tool of risk management reveals fear.
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